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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the potential benefit of corpus analysis, a (part-
ly) empirical method from linguistics, for philosophy� ‘Corpus analysis’ is not only 
the name of the method, but also a rough description of it, because the method 
consists in analysing data taken from linguistic text corpora� In linguistics, using 
such text corpora is an established practice� A fair number of them are nowadays 
freely accessible on the internet, and using them has become relatively easy, even 
for researchers without linguistic expertise� Surprisingly, corpus analysis has been 
widely disregarded by philosophers, including those that profess a methodical 
interest in language—a state of affairs that I believe ought to change� 
I shall begin with a short introduction into corpus analysis, followed by a 
couple of general remarks on why we should, in my view, use corpus analysis in 
philosophy� I shall briefly introduce examples of the little work that has been done 
with the help of corpus analysis in philosophy, which I shall contrast with the use 
of general internet search engines and questionnaires for similar purposes� I shall 
close with some remarks on the advantages and disadvantages of corpus analysis 
in philosophy, and some suggestions for directions that further philosophical 
research with the help of corpus analysis might take� 
2. Basics of corpus analysis
In order to introduce corpus analysis, it would be helpful to say what a linguistic 
text corpus is; but, regrettably, I have yet to find a completely satisfactory defini-
tion� Bluntly phrased, a text corpus is just a heap of texts; but, and here the prob-
lems lurk, not any old heap of texts is supposed to be a linguistic text corpus� For 
the purpose of this paper, I would like to evade the nicer difficulties by relying 
on the following working definition: a linguistic text corpus is, roughly speaking, 
(i) a collection of (written or spoken) texts that (ii) serves as the primary data base 
for answering language-related research questions, and (iii) has been collected 
and structured for this purpose, or is at the very least considered for this purpose� 
This characterisation suffices for my purposes, although it is not wholly satisfac-
tory� Let me hint at some of its problems� Difficulties pertain to the third criterion, 
because it is doubtful whether a precise line can be drawn between principled and 
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unprincipled collections of texts�1 This also raises the issue of balance: a linguistic 
text corpus should contain a suitable choice of texts, and suitability is not only 
relative to the use to which the corpus is put, but also to questions of representa-
tiveness� A useful corpus should be computerised and annotated, that is, in addi-
tion to the content of the texts it should contain information, e�g. on the source 
of the texts, but also grammatical information on words�2 And in order to access 
corpus data, a suitable software tool is required� Clearly some of these properties 
are normative demands, characterising usefulness instead of corpusness, but I shall 
shirk further debate and instead rely on my working definition�
There are many linguistic text corpora available� I do not have the space to 
introduce any number of them, let alone in detail�3 Two corpora that are fre-
quently mentioned beyond the boundaries of linguistics are the British National 
Corpus (abbreviated “BNC”) and the Corpus of Contemporary American Eng-
lish (“COCA”)� The BNC is a relatively large, closed corpus of texts of written 
and spoken language� It contains approximately 100 million words in texts dating 
from 1960 to 1994� The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) is 
not closed; every year approximately 20 million words are added� At present, the 
corpus comprises more than 520 million words, in about 220,000 texts dated from 
1990 to the present, the most recent stemming from December 2015� COCA has a 
quite well-balanced collecting policy, and it is 20% spoken language� Both BNC and 
COCA are freely accessible for scientific purposes, and there is a comfortable web 
interface for their use provided by the Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah�4 
The basic idea of using corpora is to have controlled access to empirical lin-
guistic data—empirical in the sense that it is language that has in fact been used� 
Having controlled access to the data of a computerised corpus on the most fun-
damental level means that a search engine can be used to query for an expression 
in the texts collected in the corpus� The search is executed very quickly, and the 
occurrences of the expression in the corpus are numbered and listed in a so-called 
KWIC index (Key Word In Context, i.e., the queried expression with short extracts 
1 Cf� Hundt (2008: 170)� 
2 Although corpora do not need to be computerised, it has to be noted that the develop-
ment of corpus linguistics is not only intimately tied to the development of computer 
technology, but that the increase in the quantity of data that can be processed has 
brought about qualitative differences in our methodical accessing of the data as well 
(cf� Bonelli 2010: 15–18)�
3 Cf� Lee (2010) or Xiao (2008) for an overview�
4 At present: <http://corpus�byu�edu/>� The interface gives access to a number of other 
corpora, too�
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of the context preceding and following it)� Usually, more of the context in which 
the key word was found can be accessed� The available search algorithms are, of 
course, much more powerful, and I am going to say more about them later� What 
is important to me here only is to point out the most basic principle of corpus 
analysis� 
It should be obvious that handling data extracted from a corpus can be a lot 
of work� For example, searching COCA for the expression ‘hope’ yields 92,467 
hits� In order to extract anything useful out of this amount of data, it needs to be 
processed somehow, and the sheer number of occurrences hints at the effort this 
may require� Given that this is so, the natural question to ask is: why bother? Why 
use corpora in philosophy at all? 
3. Why use corpora in philosophy?
Quite obviously, using corpora for philosophical purposes makes sense only if it 
matters how things are represented in language� This need not necessarily mean 
a natural language or the ordinary use or variety of a natural language, but in 
what follows I shall be mostly concerned with natural language in its ordinary 
use�5 Let me also state explicitly that I shall not offer any general justification for 
considering ordinary language in philosophy, but am only concerned with giving 
reasons for using corpora for this purpose� 
Suppose that you have a research interest and some (perhaps tacit) hypotheses 
related to the issue that you want to address� If linguistic phenomena are impor-
tant, it is still usually unclear exactly which phenomena are to be considered� For 
example, often the aim of linguistic analyses in philosophy is to analyse concepts; 
but concepts can usually be expressed in a given language in various ways� It is, 
therefore, not automatically clear, which linguistic phenomena are pertinent for 
the analytical process� Thus, the first step of linguistic analyses in philosophy is 
to clarify which expressions are to be considered at all� Only then can one form 
(again, perhaps tacit) hypotheses about their use� And only then can one test and 
refine these hypotheses by coming up with examples (linguistic contexts or hypo-
thetical cases), by interpreting them, and examining or expanding on potentially 
interesting findings through iterations and variations� Ideally, this process ends 
with conclusions being drawn from testing and refining, with the initial hypoth-
eses falsified, refined, or corroborated�
5 A corpus of utterances in an artificial language is odd only if we assume that there is no 
pragmatic context and no possibility to adapt the language to purposes that go beyond 
its rules� If the language is used, a corpus may provide insights� 
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This simplified description is sufficient to bring out that philosophical analyses 
of natural language involve intuitions in two senses of the word� On the one hand, 
intuitions in the sense of spontaneous non-inferential judgements, marked by a 
high degree of subjective certainty, that concern the acceptability of given uses of 
linguistic expressions (in linguistic or pragmatic contexts)� On the other hand, 
intuition in the sense of the faculty or ability on which judgements of the said kind 
rest, viz. competence in the object language� A linguistic analysis involves intuition 
in both senses� It requires (at various stages of the process) judgements about the 
acceptability of the use of an expression in a given context, and it requires linguis-
tic competence� In a passive sense, i.e., in the sense of the mere understanding of 
the language, this competence is required at all stages of an analysis, since you 
have to be able to understand what you are analysing (which is the reason why 
the method is only partly empirical), but in order to think of pertinent linguistic 
expressions and to construe examples of their use, an active competence in the 
object language is required� Thus, there is an active and a passive role of (the fac-
ulty of) intuition in philosophical analyses of linguistic phenomena� 
Relying on intuition, particularly in the active sense, is problematic in two 
ways� First, the faculty of intuition is relative to the individual, and everyone’s 
linguistic competence is limited, especially the active part of it: just think of the 
difference between your passive and your active vocabulary� For this reason, in-
tuition is only a limited source of data�6 It is worth mentioning at this point that 
philosophers who are not native speakers of English have an even more limited 
linguistic competence� This is relevant because English at the moment is more 
often than not the object language of philosophical research� A second problem 
in relying on intuition is the danger of bias� The one who thinks of the examples 
usually has an investment in specific hypotheses, which might bias the choice 
and the interpretation of the examples� Of course, such human weakness rarely 
does befall philosophers, but even we occasionally do fall into the mental traps 
of mere mortals� 
One might object that my picture of what is usually done in linguistic analysis 
in philosophy is too rough� I readily admit to considerable simplification� Most 
important for our purposes, there are a number of ways in which philosophers 
have tried to overcome the limits of their own intuition� This is what I like to call 
arming the armchair, and there are two time-honoured ways of doing so� The first 
6 Haß (1991: 230) points out that for this reason intuition cannot serve as a primary 
database� He also emphasizes that competence in the sense of the linguist’s trained 
understanding of language is necessary to derive hypotheses from empirical data� 
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is to ask a colleague or anyone else with respectable linguistic competence and 
sufficient patience what she or he thinks—that is, to ask an (expert) informant� The 
second is to peruse a dictionary� The aims of using a dictionary are quite similar 
to those of asking informants� One is to identify the pertinent expressions for an 
analytical task at hand, another is to get an account of the presumed meaning(s) 
of these expressions� Yet another is to be given examples for their use in ordinary 
language� 
However, neither dictionaries nor expert informants are to be trusted unques-
tioningly� First of all, neither dictionaries nor informants are without error� Some 
mistakes may be idiosyncratic; others may have systematic causes� For example, 
systematic mistakes of informants may be due to the limits of their knowledge of 
the object language� And with respect to dictionaries, we have to keep in mind 
that all dictionaries need to choose some material over other material� Not eve-
rything can be recorded; and what is to be recorded is a question of the policy of 
the dictionary� This is related to a second problem: both informants and diction-
aries rely on intuition at various points, the intuition of authors and editors, but, 
especially in older dictionaries, also the intuition of informants� Thirdly, new dic-
tionaries partly rely on older dictionaries� Dictionary writers copy to some degree 
what other dictionary writers have written� This is hardly avoidable for reasons of 
economy, and it is also a reasonable thing to do� It is an academic virtue to pre-
serve knowledge that has already been gained, but, regrettably, when we consult 
a dictionary, we do not know which material the editors of the dictionary have 
simply inherited from their predecessors� Fourthly, although dictionaries may be 
helpful for formulating preliminary hypotheses about meanings, the definitions 
sought in philosophy differ in function, focus and degree of precision from the 
paraphrases of meanings given in lexicography�7 
If we want to avoid these potential shortcomings of informants and of diction-
aries, we need some basis on which we can test, correct and extend their claims� 
More particularly, we need independent, and thus unbiased, evidence that the 
expressions we have an interest in are used in certain ways� And we need this 
independent evidence to test our hypotheses about the use of these expressions� 
The solution is, I believe, to turn to linguistic text corpora, because they fulfil 
these desiderata—at least if chosen correctly� We can assume that corpus data that 
has been recorded and compiled independently is unbiased with respect to specific 
research questions�8 But the usefulness of a corpus for a given philosophical purpose 
7 Cf� Wiegand (1989)�
8 Cf� Schütze (2010: 117)�
Roland Bluhm96
has further prerequisites� I do not want to go into much detail, but it should come 
as no surprise that the normative criteria for corpora resurface here� The first pre-
requisite is that the data contained in the corpus has to be suitable for the specific 
purpose for which it is to be used� For example, it does not make much sense to use a 
corpus of academic books to study philosophical terms as they are used in ordinary 
language� Generally speaking, the corpus has to be balanced, that is, the database 
must contain carefully weighted text types, so as not to give skewed evidence of 
language use� It has to have sufficient size to contain (enough) relevant data� Size is 
not a value in itself; for some purposes a small corpus will suffice (e�g� the study of 
a specific author’s work), but the more infrequent the phenomenon of interest, the 
bigger the corpus has to be� If nuanced and extensive interpretation is required, the 
corpus also has to contain a significant part of the context of the queried expressions� 
Some corpus tools clip these contexts due to copyright restrictions� While searches 
can be executed over the complete data, only extracts of the data are accessible for 
analysis� Another prerequisite of the usefulness of a corpus is that it is computerised 
and annotated, that is, the word tokens must have been analysed grammatically 
and semantically and have been tagged accordingly, e�g� with their grammatical 
categories� Only then can the corpus support sophisticated search algorithms and 
thus support powerful software tools to access the corpus data�
I would like to expand on the issue of annotation and search algorithms, but 
before I do so, let me mention that BNC and COCA meet these prerequisites, as 
do many other (but by no means all) corpora� 
4. How can corpora be used in philosophy?
We have moved on to the somewhat more practical questions: how can corpora be 
used in philosophy, and when should they be used? There is no exhaustive answer 
to these questions, but a picture of the possibilities can be extrapolated from the 
search options that standard corpus software offers in conjunction with examples 
of the application of corpus analysis in philosophy�
There is a variety of software tools for the use of corpora and there are differ-
ent search interfaces for corpora accessible through the internet�9 Some of the 
available search options are obvious and common, some go well beyond what the 
non-expert might expect� The most important linguistic phenomena that can be 
queried for with suitable corpus software or corpus search engines, are: (1) Words, 
9 A short overview of four generations of corpus tools is given in McEnery and Hardie 
(2012: 37–48), for a short account of their differences and their importance see An-
thony (2013)�
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i.e., expressions exactly as typed in, e�g� ‘hope’ or maybe ‘hpoe’, if you are very thor-
ough and would like to check for misspelled occurrences of a word you are looking 
for� (2) Expressions with wildcards, e�g� ‘hoping*’, which not only returns occur-
rences of ‘hoping’, but also the occurrences of all other expressions beginning with 
‘hoping’, e�g� ‘hopingly’� (3) Lemmata, i.e., all occurrences of a word, disregarding 
inflexions� Thus, searching for the lemma ‘hope’ returns not only occurrences of 
the expression ‘hope’, but also of the inflected forms ‘hopes’, ‘hoped’, and ‘hoping’� 
(4) Expressions of named grammatical categories, e�g�, occurrences of ‘hope’ as a 
noun vs. occurrences of ‘hope’ as a verb� (5) Co-occurrence of expressions (within 
a specified distance of some number of words, and sometimes within a sentence, 
as defined by punctuation, or within a specified distance of some number of sen-
tences), e�g�, you can look for co-occurrence of ‘hopes’ and ‘coffee’ within a sentence 
in order to find out how often coffee is presented as the object of someone’s hope�10 
(6) Complex expressions, e�g� the lemma ‘hope’ preceded by an adjective� Queries 
of this type, as well as for type (3), are only possible in annotated corpora� 
The uses to which these search options can be put are manifold� I would like 
to give a handful of examples that will serve to introduce both basic and more 
sophisticated possibilities�
The first is from my own research on hope� I have tried to answer the de-
scriptive question of what hope is—construed as asking for an explication of the 
concept in its ordinary language use� And I have tried to answer the normative 
question, if and how hope can be problematic� In an early phase of my research, I 
used corpora for explorative purposes, trying to identify ways in which a hope or 
a person entertaining a hope is criticised� For this purpose, I searched for occur-
rences of the German lemma ‘hoffen’ (the German verb for ‘hope’) in collocation 
with any adverb and ‘Hoffnung’ (the German noun for ‘hope’) in collocation with 
any adjective� From the search results I excluded irrelevant finds (that apparently 
had no normative component) and in this way came up with pertinent candidates� 
After repeating the process in other corpora, I analysed the occurrences of the 
word combinations in context and derived a shortlist of expressions that have in 
fact been used to portrait a hope or a hoper as somehow deficient in ordinary 
language� This “shortlist” comprises 56 expressions, including, to name just a few 
in translation, ‘vain’, ‘unrealistic’, ‘exaggerated’, ‘naïve’, ‘childish’, ‘criminal’, ‘foolish’, 
10 The results of such a query would have to be checked for relevance, because co-occur-
rences in a sentence are not necessarily tokens of ‘coffee’ being the syntactical object 
of ‘hope’, as, for example, in the following sentence: “The airline’s coffee is beyond all 
hope�” (COCA #1) 
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and ‘immoral’ hope�11 Even without going into detail, it is possible to appreciate 
that there are many ways in which hope can be deficient, and that it is possible to 
track them by looking at the language of hope�
One of my descriptive hypotheses regarding hope was that there are opposite 
affective experiences of hoping� Traditionally, if hope has been construed as some 
sort of emotion, it has always been construed as a positive one� To me that seemed 
to be an inadequate simplification� In order to test my hypothesis, I searched for 
the lemma ‘hope’ (this time in English) qualified by an adjective or adverb� The 
results showed that on the one hand there are uses of word combinations like 
‘confident’, ‘ecstatic’, ‘enraptured’, ‘excited’, ‘glowing’ and ‘patient’ hope that point 
to a positive affective experience; but on the other hand, the corpora yielded uses 
of word combinations that suggest a quite different affective experience of hop-
ing: ‘wistful’, ‘tense’, ‘uneasy’, ‘nervous’, ‘worried’, ‘anxious’, and ‘desperate’ hope� 
An example in context is the following: “Three children, aged between four and 
seven, scream as uniformed East Berlin police drag them and their mother off and 
push them into a lorry as they stand outside the US embassy in East Berlin, hoping 
desperately to get inside�” (BNC #1) I took the factual use of such word combina-
tions to be one piece of evidence in favour of my view that hope may not only be 
a positive and pleasant, but also a negative and unpleasant affective experience�12
Barbara Vetter (2014) uses corpus linguistics in an ontological paper that de-
fends her non-conditional conception of dispositions� Among the many argu-
ments she advances, there is one that is based on a corpus analysis� It is not 
necessary to rehearse the details of Vetter’s position to understand that the corpus 
analysis is used to debunk a counter-argument levelled against Vetter’s theory of 
dispositions� This counter-argument is based on the linguistic intuitions of her 
opponents, who claim that the expression ‘disposed to’ is used in a certain way in 
conditional sentences structures (with ‘if ’ and ‘when’); but, as Vetter observes, of 
the 226 pertinent occurrences of ‘disposed to’ in COCA, none supports her op-
ponents’ view: “In the entire corpus, there is not a single example of ‘disposed to’ 
being used to ascribe to a concrete, inanimate subject a relatively permanent and 
intrinsic tendency to behave in certain ways—a disposition in the philosophers’ 
sense” (Vetter 2014: 16)� Based on her findings, Vetter argues that her opponents’ 
intuitions do not constitute evidence, because the expression ‘disposed to’ in the 
construction that they have pointed to is a technical term� And what’s more, it is 
11 In German: ‘vergebliche’, ‘unrealistische’, ‘überzogene’, ‘naïve’, ‘kindische’, ‘kriminelle’, 
‘närrische’, and ‘unmoralische Hoffnung’� The complete list can be found in Bluhm 
(2012: 188f)� 
12 For the full argument, cf� Bluhm (2012: 139–186)�
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a technical term rooted in the theory that her opponents have expounded� Their 
counter- argument, Vetter argues, is, therefore, begging the question� 
Aurélie Herbelot (Ms�) introduces some ways of using corpora in philosophy 
that differ from the ones I have introduced so far� They rely on computational 
methods based on distributional semantics, as opposed to the more pedestrian 
approaches I have described so far� Distributional semantics (roughly speaking) 
views the meaning of words as their distribution, that is, the linguistic contexts 
they are associated with� Suitably represented in a mathematical model, distri-
butions can be calculated from large corpora� Herbelot introduces three ways 
in which this can be put to use in philosophy� In discourse analysis, it can help 
identify social construction through the analysis of language patterns in large 
corpora� Thus, Herbelot, Redecker, and Müller (2012) show that different genders 
are associated with different words and word fields� Distributional analyses can 
also be used in the history of ideas� For example, they can assist in the analysis 
of the use of important concepts by specific authors� And they may be used to 
experimentally evaluate philosophical theories by testing their formalisation on 
ordinary language corpora—on the condition that the theories can be taken to 
predict certain language patterns� 
Although I have so far presented only a very limited number of examples for 
the use of corpus analysis in philosophy, it should have become apparent that 
there is wide scope for the data contained in corpora to be accessed and used for 
research purposes� For example, most of the examples I have discussed rely on 
the individual interpretation of corpus query results, but there is also the more 
automatized approach to corpus analyses suggested by Herbelot, which saves 
much of the effort involved in the extensive examination of search results� I shall 
say more about such differences in approach in the final section of this paper� 
First, I would like to discuss two other methodological options�
5. A similar option: Internet search engines
Sometimes general internet search engines are used for much the same purposes 
as the ones I have been discussing� In recent times, it has become somewhat 
popular among philosophers to use general internet search engines (like Google, 
Yahoo, Bing or, hopefully, any of the smaller, less domineering alternatives) to 
find out whether something is an actual use of a concept at issue� Obviously, some 
degree of empirical backing is sought for claims about language use� It is, I believe, 
fitting to introduce some published examples of this approach here� 
An attempt to use an internet search engine in philosophy in much the same 
way as a corpus analyst would use a corpus was made by Peter Ludlow (2005), the 
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earliest published example of its kind that has come to my notice� Ludlow used 
Google to find examples for uses of the verb ‘to know’ or the noun ‘knowledge’ with 
some sort of linguistic modifier� His aim was to identify what he calls “L-marked” 
phrases of ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’; essentially, linguistic expressions that qualify 
the words in a certain way and in a certain thematic domain�13 Thus, for example, 
Ludlow queried the phrases ‘known by * standards’ or ‘with * standards of knowl-
edge’, yielding results like ‘known by any objective standard’ or ‘with general con-
temporary standards of knowledge’� Ludlow thus shows that ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ 
in fact have a variety of “L-marked positions […] for standards of justification and 
evidence, for subjective certainty of the report, for the reporter’s responsibility for 
having and defending the knowledge, the source of the knowledge, and the mode of 
presentation of the content of the knowledge report” (Ludlow 2005: 20)� And these 
findings he believes to be evidence for contextualism with respect to knowledge� 
René van Woudenberg (2009) takes a different approach� The question he pur-
sues is whether we are responsible for what we believe� Based on the claim that 
this idea underlies much of our social life, he wants to oppose the sceptics by 
pointing out that it cannot, therefore, be given up, without far-reaching and seri-
ous consequences� In one substantial part of the paper, van Woudenberg uses an 
internet search to support his claim by showing that “[t]he use of deontological 
epistemic expressions is ubiquitous” (2009: 50)� He explicitly states: “My proce-
dure will be to select one deontological term at a time (‘obligation to/duty to/
ought to’, ‘permission to’ and ‘right to’) and to consider various combined hits 
with belief, know(ledge), forgetting, and ignorance respectively” (2009: 50)� And 
this is indeed what he does� As is to be expected when the internet is used as the 
database, the examples are from a wide variety of sources, ordinary and technical� 
Regrettably, there is no information as to how van Woudenberg narrowed down 
the presumably much more extensive results� At any rate, the examples that he 
discusses are pertinent uses of the listed deontological expressions�
A somewhat more quantitative procedure is employed by Kevin Reuter (2011)� 
Reuter uses findings from a web search to show that―contrary to a widely held 
conviction in philosophy―people do in fact distinguish linguistically between ap-
parent and real pain� This is contrary to the philosophical tenet that, with regard 
to pain, there is no conceptual distinction between appearance and reality� Or, 
more simply, to feel a pain is to have it� Reuter observes that there is a difference 
in the relative frequency of expressions referring to ‘having’ vs. ‘feeling’ pain, 
13 The core of the question is “whether the lexical structure of the verb is such that it associ-
ates the verb with certain phrases that incorporate thematic roles” (Ludlow 2005: 18)�
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if the pain is described as strong or intense� According to his interpretation, if 
people speak of ‘feeling’ pain, it is to be construed as an introspective report that 
allows for some uncertainty, whereas to speak of ‘having’ pain is to present it as 
an objective fact� The empirical part of his argument is based on findings from 
three search engines (Google, Yahoo, Bing)� Reuter compares the number of hits 
received for expressions with ‘feel’ vs. ‘have’, ‘pain’, and a list of four adjectives 
expressing a low or high degree of intensity of pain� Internet queries notoriously 
do not allow the deduction of reliable statistical information, among other reasons 
because they yield page hits instead of listing all tokens that were found� Reuter 
dodges this problem by comparing the rough ratio of hits for the collocation of 
‘have’ and ‘feel’ in conjunction with low and high intensity of pain yielded from the 
different search engines� He observes that ‘feel’ and ‘have’ are used roughly with 
the same frequency in reference to weak pain, but that ‘have’ is used at a much 
higher ratio in reference to strong pain� Based on the assumption that ‘feel’ and 
‘have’ can be associated with appearance and reality respectively, Reuter takes this 
as an argument against the philosophical precept cited above� 
There are a number of reasons in favour of using general internet search en-
gines to query for linguistic phenomena pertinent to philosophical issues� First 
of all, the internet is indeed mouth-watering for any empirically-minded linguist 
because of its sheer size� A considered estimate from 2008 calculates that 60% 
of what is termed the “visible internet” is in English, amounting to an estimated 
3 trillion (3 × 1012) words (Bergh & Zanchetta 2008: 313)�14 Given the speed with 
which the internet is growing, this number today should be much higher� The 
second major argument for using the internet as a database is the wide diversity 
of the texts contained in it� The third is the relative ease with which data can be 
compiled from the internet� And the fourth is that not only is access to all the data 
relatively easy, but, on top of that, it is mostly free of charge� 
There are, however, some serious downsides to using the internet as a corpus�15 
First of all, English (or rather, some language that resembles English) is used on 
the internet by a large number of speakers who have limited linguistic competence 
because it is not their native language� The fact that some usage can be observed 
is thus not necessarily good evidence for its acceptability� Secondly, and more 
crippling, I believe, are limitations of access� Present-day internet search engines 
14 It is not wholly clear whether the expression “visible internet” is supposed to refer to 
the generally accessible code of web pages or to the text to be read with the help of 
browsers minus code and markup language tags� One would suppose, from the name, 
that it is the second alternative�
15 Cf� Kilgarriff (2007) and Bergh and Zanchetta (2008) for much of the following�
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offer fewer search algorithms than corpus tools do� As opposed to a well-kept 
corpus, the internet is also not linguistically annotated and thus lacks information 
that is necessary for more sophisticated queries� On top of such qualitative limita-
tions of access, there are also quantitative limitations� The number of queries on 
a given day with a given search engine is limited by the search engine providers� 
This is unproblematic for everyday use of search engines, but poses problems for 
extensive research� Thirdly, internet search engines do not allow the deduction 
of reliable statistical information, at least not without refinement of the search 
results� One of the reasons is that search engines return hits by source, that is, by 
web page, instead of by token� Another reason is that the results of queries with 
general internet search engines are (usually) not reproducible because they are 
handled by different servers on the basis of different indices of the internet—
which alone suffices to make their integration into the canon of experimental 
approaches questionable, given that a core feature of experiments is repeatability�16
It is therefore not very advisable simply to use the web as a corpus (WaC)� It is 
viable to use data extracted from the internet as raw material for building a cor-
pus, that is, to use the “web for corpus” (WfC), as it is called in corpus linguistics� 
However, while using the web for building a corpus is respectable (and might be 
a future option), this is not what is in fact done today when philosophers type a 
query into a common internet search engine� 
6. An alternative option: Questionnaires
Corpus analysis, WaC, and WfC are all attempts to overcome the limitations of 
individual intuition� Another option for doing so—put to sophisticated use by 
experimental philosophers—is to use questionnaires in controlled settings to 
obtain informants’ views on how a specific concept is used� This is by no means 
the most common objective pursued by questionnaire studies in experimental 
philosophy� More common is the attempt to discern intuitive commitment to 
judgements that are relevant to some philosophical issue� However, my focus is 
16 It has to be conceded that corpus analysis is not altogether free of this problem either� 
When different software tools are used on one and the same corpus, they may yield 
different results (cf� Anthony 2013: 150f�)� However, my objection stands, because the 
results of using a specific software tool on a specific corpus can indeed be reproduced 
reliably�
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on approaches that take linguistic phenomena as a starting point, something that 
enjoys a certain prominence in experimental philosophy, too�17 
For the purpose of studying linguistic phenomena, questionnaires can be used 
either indirectly, by asking whether certain constructions are or are not objection-
able, or even directly, by asking how the informants would characterise the mean-
ing of a specific concept (although I am not aware of examples of this somewhat 
simplistic approach)� One thing to be said in favour of employing questionnaires 
is that they, too, like corpora, complement and (in part) replace the researcher’s 
intuitions regarding the use of expressions under discussion� Another is that ques-
tionnaires allow the posing of questions regarding very specific and very infre-
quent uses of such expressions� This is an advantage of questionnaires over corpus 
analysis, given that philosophers are often interested in more subtle variations in 
the use of some linguistic phenomenon� Questionnaires also allow controlled vari-
ation in order to bring out subtle aspects of language use� Unless a corpus is built 
from a very repetitive type of text, e�g� telephone conversations for the purpose of 
fixing appointments, it is unlikely that it contains many such variations� 
These are considerable advantages� However, I would like to emphasise two re-
spects in which corpus analysis may be more advantageous� First, it is to be noted 
that questionnaires are usually given to a very limited number of test subjects 
and, therefore, do not necessarily solve the problem of limited active linguistic 
intuition� Secondly, the major flaw of this method, in my eyes, is that it draws the 
informants’ attention to their use of the language and thereby invites answers that 
do not provide information on how informants do use a specific concept, but on 
how they believe they use the concept—or should use the concept�18 Psychology 
has, of course, established means to draw the attention of subjects away from 
whatever it is the experiment tries to get a grip on, but I am somewhat sceptical 
that this will work when one is testing for variations in language use� 
I would like to support this claim with the help of an example� Patricia Bruininks 
and Bertram Malle (2008) have published the results of an interesting and well-
designed questionnaire study on hope� One of their observations was that test sub-
jects associated more important objects with ‘hope’ than they did with ‘optimism’, 
‘desire’, ‘wanting’, and ‘wishing’ (cf� Bruininks and Malle 2008: 348f)� However, this 
is not confirmed by a corpus analysis� Quite the opposite, ‘hope’ is commonly used 
in cases of tepid hope and hope for trivial things, and no association of the kind 
17 In fact, the earliest pieces of experimental philosophy avant la lettre that I am aware 
of, Naess (1953) and (1960), are concerned (although not exclusively) with meaning� 
18 In this context we should also note, if only in passing, that the construction of a ques-
tionnaire may be biased and thus bias the answers of the subjects�
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observed by Bruininks and Malle is evident when we look at the use of the word in 
unprompted contexts� I believe that their result is due to a biasing effect� There is a 
powerful ideology of hope� People seem to think that hope should be for something 
important, where ‘important’ may be read subjectively as ‘something one attaches 
great importance to’ or objectively as ‘something that is indeed worth attaching 
great importance to’� If subjects are conscious that they are being asked about hope, 
they will, I believe, tend to answer questionnaires in a way that conforms to their 
normative ideas about hope�
A similar concern may be voiced with respect to empirical research on causal 
reasoning�19 Since insights into causal reasoning may be gained from the study 
of causal argument, one strain of this research focusses on the study of real-life 
arguments; but as Deanna Kuhn observes, “researchers studying causal reasoning 
skills in adults have typically based their conclusions on studies of a narrow seg-
ment of the adult population in a specific context—college students in laboratory 
settings performing complex paper-and-pencil tasks” (Kuhn 2007: 44)� The main 
advantage of structured interviews in lab-style settings is that they, too, allow a 
maximum of control and can be efficiently used to assess behaviour in response 
to minimally varied conditions; but even if Kuhn’s critique regarding the choice 
of subjects is heeded and a more diverse sample of subjects is recruited, we may 
still worry about the lab-context� Its artificiality might influence the subjects’ 
responses, not least by priming their attention to aspects of the situation that are 
relevant to the issue under inquiry� 
One way to alleviate such worries is to turn to corpus analysis� Again, not to 
supplant, but to supplement other empirical methods� While there is some im-
pressive work on causal arguments by linguists,20 philosophers so far have made 
no use of corpus analysis in their study of causal arguments� This is somewhat 
surprising, because argumentation is a frequent linguistic activity and causal rea-
soning in turn is frequent in arguments� Linguistic data for the study of causal 
reasoning is therefore readily available in corpora� As a matter of fact, there is 
such a wide variety of linguistic markers for causality, viz. causal connectives, 
verbs, adjectives, and prepositions,21 that the challenge is not to find data but not 
to be overwhelmed by its wealth� As I have argued above, data from corpora can 
be considered to be unbiased (on the condition that it has been recorded and 
19 Cf� Hahn, Zenker, and Bluhm (forthcoming)�
20 Most notably, Oestermeier and Hesse (2000)�
21 Cf� Altenberg (1984); Khoo, Chan, and Niu (2002); and Diessel and Hetterle (2011)�
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compiled independently), and given the right source of data, we can observe 
argumentation in comparatively natural environments� 
7. Ups and downs of corpus analysis 
It is quite obvious that there are some disadvantages and limitations to corpus 
analysis as a method for philosophy� Most importantly, corpus analysis is not 
suitable for addressing many philosophical questions, including questions with 
a strong empirical component� Language is not always relevant� And even if it 
is, corpus analysis may not always be the tool of choice� For some purposes (e�g� 
subtle variations on some linguistic theme), questionnaire studies have clear ad-
vantages� It is also worth pointing out that corpora provide textual context, but 
a limited amount of other contexts� For example, if they contain only language 
recorded in writing, they (usually) lack information on non-verbal linguistic 
phenomena (e�g� prosody and breaks), para-linguistic phenomena (e�g� gestures, 
facial expressions, and body language), and non-linguistic context� Another limit 
to corpus analysis is that the evidence it provides only has so much weight� The 
fact that some expression cannot be found in a corpus does not prove anything 
at all; and the fact that it can be found does not prove that it is well-formed in 
the language� If you like an aphorism: the advantage of corpora is that they give 
evidence of actual instead of merely possible uses of language; the disadvantage 
is that they give merely evidence of actual uses of language and not of (all) pos-
sible ones� Given all these limitations, it is also relevant to admit that analysing a 
concept with the help of a corpus is a lot (!) of work, at least if it is done by hand� 
Such efforts are only to be undertaken if they promise worthwhile results� 
Still, there are a number of benefits of using corpora—again presuming that 
linguistic surface phenomena matter� Most importantly, they provide independent 
data, removing many if not all biasing effects� On the basis of this data, hypotheses 
can be formulated; and hypotheses and conclusions can be confirmed or falsi-
fied with it� The data can also be used to exemplify or illustrate specific usages 
of interest� I think it is important to stress that one of the rationales for using 
corpora is that they can provide positive evidence for claims about the use of a 
given expression� Wherever the use of ordinary language has some argumenta-
tive force, corpus analyses, thus, may provide positive reasons for philosophical 
claims� I think it is worth underlining this point because my impression is that 
one of the predominant methods in philosophy is simply to claim something and 
then see whether anyone comes along and disproves the claim� That is slightly 
odd� I am not saying that it is always wrong, but I would hold that being able to 
give positive reasons is preferable� 
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There are also two somewhat more incidental benefits of using corpora I would 
like to mention: one is that the contexts in which the queried expressions are 
found give insights into the variety of real life situations in which the phenomenon 
referred to by the expressions occurs� Another is that they often provide inspira-
tion or excellent raw material for thought-experiments with regard to the concept 
or the phenomenon in question�
Although I have given only a very limited number of examples for the use 
of corpus analysis in philosophy, and although I have only briefly sketched the 
features of corpus software, my account does give an inkling of the range of ap-
plications that corpus analysis may have in philosophy� In corpus linguistics, there 
are two general research strategies� Corpus-driven research uses corpora in an 
explorative fashion, with minimal hypotheses as to the linguistic forms relevant 
to a given research question; corpus-based research uses them to verify or falsify 
hypotheses about the use of language on the basis of available theories about lin-
guistic forms�22 Both strategies are mirrored in the different functions that corpus 
analysis may serve in philosophy� They can be used in an explorative manner to 
facilitate philosophical research for which linguistic phenomenon are somehow 
pertinent; but they can also be used more strictly to gather evidence to support or 
undermine philosophically relevant claims� I would also like to draw attention to 
the fact that there are differences with respect to the level of complexity exhibited 
by the queried expressions� Clearly, research cannot only focus on words, but 
also on expressions consisting of two or more words� It is also possible to make 
sentences the object of study, and even more complex patterns of language, an 
example of which are arguments spanning more than one sentence� And, last but 
not least, there is a difference between qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
the latter of which are especially tempting because they promise to much reduce 
the toil of interpretation�
The examples I have cited are all concerned with semantics, but research based 
on syntactic phenomena would also be possible,23 just as, given the right corpus, 
pragmatics� And there are other research interests that corpus analysis may serve, 
although no attempt has been made to do so thus far� Thus, corpus analysis can 
be used to discern inter-linguistic and intra-linguistic similarities and differences� 
Experimental philosophy has posed the question whether there are differences in 
intuition between people of different native tongues� Another big issue is whether 
22 Cf� Biber (2010)�
23 This possibility is also mentioned by Louw (2011: 181f�), but I am not convinced by 
his example�
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there are differences between the intuitions of experts and those of lay people� 
From a corpus linguistic standpoint, this may be viewed as a sociolinguistic ex-
ercise, for which evidence can be taken from comparative corpora� 
Arianna Betti notes that “any methodological position must be applied consist-
ently, and in the case of ordinary language philosophy I do not see how we can 
avoid resorting scrupulously to the wealth of empirical linguistic research avail-
able today” (Betti 2014: 50)� Betti, admittedly, believes that the method of ordinary 
language philosophy yields untenable results, at least with respect to ontology; but 
I do not claim her as a proponent of ordinary language philosophy, only quote her 
for the assessment I whole heartedly agree with: if one believes in the importance 
of ordinary language for philosophy, it is hard to see how empirical research is 
to be avoided� This is also true with respect to other questions that experimental 
philosophers have not only asked but are actually trying to answer—provided 
that there is a linguistic angle to them� Philosophers can decide to leave the em-
pirical research to the linguists; but the happy news is that the accessibility of big 
linguistic text corpora through the internet has made corpus analysis a feasible 
option for non-linguists, too� 
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